Following quickly on the heels of the executive risk manager panel was a discussion on "Enterprise Risk Management: Integrating Risk and Performance Management - A Multidisciplinary View on Risk."

And might I say, I am amazed at the size of the crowd still in attendance. Hundreds! Snowstorm? What snowstorm? Bah!

Readers will forgive me if I am short on names and titles appearing on this panel. I showed up a few minutes late and there were some switches made. I caught the names of a few of them, but only the first name and company of the last. Appearing, then: Kevin Buehler, Director, McKinsey (and moderator); Jonathan Stein, VP and CRO, Hess Corporation; Kanwardeep Ahluwalia, Head of Financial Risk Management, Swiss Re; Glenn Labhart, President of Labhart Risk Advisors, and Rodney, from Vanguard.

Here are some of the highlights:

Buehler: How does risk management work in your company?

Ahluwalia: Swiss Re uses a three signature process to increase accountability and ensure that multiple parties are involved in decision making processes.

Stein: At Hess, the key is to be transparent. One needs to be consistent too, and this is accomplished with formal, standardized processes (be it in determining metrics, governance, etc).

Labhart: Mr. Labhart looks at the energy value chain as a model - production, processing, and storage are elements along this chain that must be considered. The point is to identify and define what physical risks you have to better understand exposure, and the best way to hedge/mitigate the risks.


Buehler: On risk and return trade-offs: How do you make sure people take it seriously when executives are most interested in just looking at returns?

Stein: Change is coming through increased transparency and how to promulgate the risk structure. Qualitative and quantitative methods are being combined, the latter providing a basis for discussion for the former.

Strategists make assumptions five to ten years out, whereas risk managers get bogged down in, for example, correlations. Risk managers need to do better in making more strategic assumptions.

Labhart: Business units and risk units need to communicate more effectively so there is one view everyone shares, and there are no misunderstandings.


Question from audience: During annual budget and strategic reviews, is enterprise risk management considered?

Roger: One problem to consider is how to collate all the information coming from below to convey to executives.

Labhart: The reviews are the best time to capitalize on the relationships created throughout the year. Leverage these connections so that all voices can be heard and understood for moving forward.


Question from the audience: How long can CEOs hold out and listen to risk managers when the sky seems to be so blue? When things look golden in the market, for how long can the CEO take the advice of risk managers and keep his foot off the pedal?

Ahluwalia: It's a very good question. Even in good times, though, what are the signals for bad turns? Bringing this to the fore is difficult too. Personalities of CEOs differ, but the imporant thing is to make decisions. Good or bad, decision making provides practice and allows for the ability to self-correct when the time comes.

Stein: How do you turn risk analysis into action? When risk appetites are too great, how do you implement measures (triggers) that mitigate doomsday events?

Rodney: Guiding principles, values, ethics keep you on the right path. For example, when internet stocks were soaring and looked great, Vanguard did not bite because they did not fit into our core focus. We avoided them and did not get burned when the bubble burst.



And that... my friends... is it for my reporting from GARP's 11th annual convention! I hope you all enjoyed my notes, and I look forward to seeing you at upcoming events.

Until then, let it snow...

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Posted by Shaun Randol at 3:49 PM 0 comments

Following the keynote address by Susan Schmidt Bries, a panel of experts convened to ruminate on the concept, "Executive Risk Managers - The CRO Perpsective."

Panelists included moderator Aaron Brown , CRO at AQR Capital Management; Ken Abbott, Managing Director at Morgan Stanley; Lawrence Prybylski, Partner at Ernst & Young; Dan Rodriguez, CRO at Credit Suisse; and Ken Winston, CRO at Western Asset Management.

Here are some of the highlights:

Aaron Brown: Which risk management tools proved their worth over the past couple of years? Which did not?

Winston: VaR is a normal market tool, and for commodity markets VaR did its job - a 99% success rate. In other arenas, however, it fell short. What is the optimal time window, to examine, for example? VaR proved problematic because of the uncertainty of the answer.

Also, stress testing fell short because of unanticipated shocks. Winston likes of idea stress-testing/VaR calculations in Monte Carlo frameworks.

Rodriguez: VaR keeps you distracted from tails. You need to focus on tail risks. Be dynamic in your view to see where you can get hit.

Winston: VaR = worthless and pernicious. Large operations waste time with VaR and they distract from real risks. VaR does not encourage diversification, rather it encourages tail risk. Co-variances from one period cannot be used in another period. Scenario analysis is too variant to account for fat tail risk. Risk managers need deep knowledge of markets and quantitative tools.


Brown: Are risk managers worthless because they did not predict the crisis?

Winston: The question has the premise that the job of risk managers is to predict unforseen hazards. This is very difficult, and predictions could have been better. There was a failure in managing rather than predicting risks. Types of qualitative measures should be used as well.

Rodriguez: Risk managers use a dynamic, evolving view. They must synthesize information, have an awareness of uncertaintity (e.g. regulatory). Across the industry, risk managers could have performed better. Agrees that qualitative information and analysis should also be incorporated.

Prybylski: Risk managers did not have a seat at the table in strategic thinking and planning. Moving forward, risk managers will not be isolated from Boards, product design, long term strategies, etc.


Brown: On regulations, which are good and which should we watch?

Prybylski: Positive elements coming from regulators and supervisors include FSB Publications of best practices. Also, pushing Boards to get more pro-active and forcing conversations with risk managers.

Unfortunately, firms are struggling with how to deal with liquidity risks. Risk managers are aware of regulatory uncertaintity and the implications for organizations. Companies are in states of impasse - resolution of this is important.


Brown: On the appointment of a systemic risk regulator, is this positive or negative idea?

Rodriguez: He likes the potential of reinforcing the Federal Reserve with potential system risk regulators. It's too early to tell, near-term effectiveness is a fantasy. He is not hopeful that regulation will pass anytime soon.

Winston: Systemic risk is being created by uncertainty across the industry over what will happen. A great deal of risk still exists.


And that's that!

Up next: enterprise risk management

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Posted by Shaun Randol at 3:13 PM 0 comments

The threat of blizzard has had little deterrent on GARP conventioneers. Hundreds filled the room this morning to listen to a keynote address by a cheerful Susan Schmidt Bies, consultant and former Federal Reserve Board Governor. Here are some highlights from her speech (paraphrased, of course, don't quote her!).

Ms. Schmidt Bies wanted to tie the theme of GARP's conference (Transforming Risk in a New World Order) to emphasize some risk management failures in the recent economic crisis. Specifically she aimed at mortgage and commercial real estate lending. She likened the crisis to the movie Groundhog Day, in which the main character is doomed to re-live the same day everyday until he learns his lesson. For our purposes, a real estate crisis grips some part of this country on average every ten years. It appears our Groundhog Day schedule runs in ten year cycles.

For Ms. Schmidt Bies, the problem did not rest on hedge funds or in derivatives or in private equity. The crisis landed squarely on the shoulders of mortgage and real estate lending. Let's looks at some of the facts:

• Between 2004-2006, new home sales were over one million, well above the growth in number of households--thus, a surplus in houses came about.
• Investor demand normally occupies 1/12 of the sales of new homes. During the bubble, investor demand ranged from 40-60%--hence, speculation abounded.

That said, what is the main lesson to take away from the crisis? That nobody was paying attention to the markets. Big mistake. What was happening instead?

1. Banks were reaching outside their traditional, market footprints. For example, North Dakota banks were making loans in Florida, well outside their footprint.
2. Banks lost sight of what lending should be: they were based on asset-priced lending versus being based on the ability to repay.
3. Credit models were inappropriate for lending. FICO, for example, worked in the 1990s when there was no bubble. FICO measures a willingness to pay rather than an ability to pay, thus no good for the housing bubble. Loan types changed as well: no dock loans and complex loans came into vogue, and they were peddled to those with lesser levels of financial literacy. 228 loans, with their automatic, periodic payment jumps, were passed on too easily.

One real problem with the recent crisis is that banks and financial services moved from customer-based to transaction-based mentalities. Mortgage lending provides a prime example; but when bankers' bonueses are tied to the closing of a deal, the problem is bound to be exacerbated. With the transaction-based mentality, value and risk are overlooked.

In short, Ms. Schmidt Bies says when you have a market failure you cannot rely on market mechanisms to correct the mistakes.

On Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: the entities were pressured to buy the junk mortgages and to push the American dream of home ownership (not good things).

On Basel II and risk-based capital: how does one measure liquidity risk? More liquidity should equal more capital. When systemic risk is addressed lack of liquidity is often overlooked.

Leading up to the crisis, Ms. Schmidt Bries says there was too much reliance on VaR models. The lookback periods were way too short, often just 100-200 days. This short attention fueled a downward spiral of bad risk measurement and its consequent investments. Tails, not variances, need more attention. One only goes to capital for unusual and unforseen events - stress testing will assist in correcting these oversights.

Ms. Schmidt Bries says leverage ratios are not good as well. She is concerned over Basel discussions about this because capital held is supposed to be based on assets. But, a) every asset is not equally risky, and b) when based on assets, one often ignores risks off the books (see Bear Sterns).

There are also accounting issues that need tackled, especially for marked-to-market non-trading assets and liabilities. These were highly leveraged during the bubble and needed to be drastically de-leveraged when the bubble burst. Fair value accounting is needed.

In closing, Ms. Schmidt Bries wants to know: what are risk managers going to do to make sure Groundhog Day in the financial world is not going to be re-lived again? Historic precedence should sound alarm bells. Currently too much risk is siloed; CROs need to open risk management to other business units.

Up next: panel on executive risk managers

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Posted by Shaun Randol at 11:46 AM 0 comments

Jon Spector, CEO of The Conference Board, led a conversation with Michael Fallon, Member of Parliament for Sevenoaks and Member of Treasury Select Committee.

Ladies and gentlemen of the Risk Exchange audience, let me caution you: this conversation was rapid fire!!! I took as many notes as possible and tried to keep up with all of the points brought up, but I must say: what follows below is merely a paraphrased conversation. Neither Mr. Spector nor Mr. Fallon should be quoted! Information presented below is merely to give those not in attendance the gist of the positively interesting (and fast!) conversation between these two experienced and thoughtful men.

With that said…

Mr. Spector led the discussion, but threw the floor open to the audience from time to time. It made for a dynamic conversation, much appreciated after a long day. To wit:

JS. Are there steps companies should be taking to limit executive pay? Is executive compensation an issue?
MF. Yes. Governments need to determine, for example, proportionality of compensation.

JS. How do you determine proportionality?
MF. Profits, revenues, relationships to previous years, remuneration generally across the company – all of these elements must be taken into consideration. One cannot tackle it in isolation. If there is no relationship, it becomes unbelievable to the public.

JS. Are there companies we think that are fully ignoring these points?
MF. Governance has improved, especially in terms of transparency. Non public companies, however, are able to get away with more.

JS. It’s a complicated process you describe.
MF. [here MF responded with questions of his own]: Is there accountability to the compensation committees? Are they answerable to shareholders? Was there shareholder activism, or was there opportunity for it?

JS. Now for the role of government. What have you done in the UK?
MF. Requiring annual vote on compensation report, compensation committee chairman, annually. Regulators should have authority to issue mandatory guidance at below board levels, such as pay ratios from highest to lowest pay rates.

JS. Most CEOs are nervous about impending scope of regulatory changes. What do risk managers think of these looming changes? Relief? Concern? Does it make your job more difficult?
Audience: Quite bluntly it’s a waste of time. Compensation has little to do with the riskiness of a company’s situation.
MF. It was not the level of compensation that brought banks down, but some might have encouraged shorter term thinking and strategies. Second, lots of public money has been put to boost the banking system, indeed upwards of 74% of UK GDP. Given high levels of compensation, and huge cost of bailout, the government and people deserve a say in pay structure.

JS. Will new regulations hinder ability to compete?
MF. It’s a strong argument deployed by European banks. Nevertheless, it’s a real and serious issue in UK that must be dealt with. It’s one reason the one-time windfall tax has been introduced in UK. MF is not a fan of windfall taxes, but tax money must be recouped and banks have actually benefited from receiving cheap money to turn into extraordinary large profits. The taxpayer is deserving of a share of that.

UK banking sector is 4 times size of UK’s economy(!!)


JS. On the societal aspects of executive pay: is it a populist issue? If it is, how do companies respond? Is the populist outrage over compensation at a dangerous level? Is there too much scrutiny? Is the populism falling? What are the implications?
Audience: Society definitely has an issue in Nigeria. Corporate remuneration is definitely an issue, including executive tenure.
Audience: Yes, we have a societal issue. Not just in finance, but in other sectors like energy. …There has to be accountability, that there are consequences for irresponsible behavior.

JS. Are we at a societal breaking point?
MF. There is an enormous backlash. And now there is a realization that banks and financial institutions are different kinds of companies than mainstream companies, and now the trust put into these institutions has been fractured.

When people see it is their money at stake, they take a proprietary interest in the fairness of corporate actions.

Audience: Analogy – movie stars get paid almost as much as traders on Wall Street, but there is no outcry for expensive films or actors. The reason is: they are not too big to fail. If they fail, so be it. With banks, that’s different: too big to fail has massive consequences on societal fabric. Maybe we need to make sure banks are not too big to fail.
MF. You don’t have to go to the movies, but you do have to have an institution to deposit and handle money transactions. But what makes bank execs so special that they cannot get out of bed without tremendous bonuses?

Think of General McChrystal in Afghanistan. He is protecting the security of an entire country, yet he does not demand the same kind of compensations.

…

MF. UK does not have nearly as much competition between banks as in the U.S. In UK, why aren’t new banks, such as in retail sector, coming online? How do we stimulate competition in UK?

On shareholder activism – shareholders need to be more involved in the compensation process.

Audience: There is a history of director linkngs, a I-scratch-your-back, you-scratch-my-back mentality.
MF. Not anymore. Banks are losing the rationale for this behavior. If they don’t get out and explain their behavior, regulators will come after them. Transparency is a must that should increase rational behavior.

Audience: Regarding competition: there is an argument that competition increased market uncertainty that forced banks to create more attractive packages for new customers, that may not have been in the best interest of the public.
MF. To an extent, that was true. But the top 5 banks maintain control over 75% of certain banking sectors in the UK. The point MF wants to make is that there may be too many barriers to new entrances into the banking industry.


JS. Prediction: This issue will ebb and flow, but it will come back again, because of one law – law of unintended consequences. We need to invest into the science of executive compensation.

***

With that, the discussion ended. A large group swarmed the stage to further pick the brains of Mr. Spector and Mr. Fallon. Another large goup headed for the cocktail hour... all in all, a very full and productive day!

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Posted by Shaun Randol at 4:57 PM 0 comments

It's impossible to cover all the multiple, simultaneous tracks. I've stuck my head into every single one of them--and you know what? Wow! Full crowds in each one! The energetic attendance for all of these nuanced break-outs is a true measure of the excitement surrounding the many facets of risk management in these trying economic times.

Here's a full rundown of the program. There were 9 today, there'll be 10 tomorrow. Too many too cover!

So, I thought I'd take a walk around the exhibition hall, peek at a few nametags, talk to a few people, and get a general feeling for the mood of those in attendance. Here's what I heard in just a quick, 15 minute stroll during the afternoon break:

- Someone said to me: "Ken Abbott! Ever get a chance to hear him, go out of your way--a very refreshing talk." Mr. Abbott is a Managing Director at Morgan Stanley. He spoke about Basel implementation.

- A gentelman on the phone to his colleague stuck in his office: "It's great! I can't stop taking notes!"

- I picked up conversation in French, Hindi, Chinese and Russian.

- Robert Jackson must have made quite an impression with his keynote address on executive compensation. I heard a duo and a trio discussing this, while an energetic foursome in between animatedly discussed the merits of - or lack thereof - of Basel II.


Up next: panel discussion on executive pay - starting now!

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Posted by Shaun Randol at 3:27 PM 0 comments

Following the keynote address was a panel discussion: The New Role of the CRO: Empowered, Equipped and Engaged.

I had to duck out for a meeting, so I could only catch the gist of two of the panelists' remarks. Here are some quick notes:

Three panelists participated in the discussion:

Anthony Santomero – Senior Advisor to McKinsey, Board of Citigroup and Citibank NA
Jacob Rosengarten – Executive VP, Prez and Chief Enterprise Risk Officer at XL Capital
William Martin – Chief Risk Officer of Commonfund, Chairman of GARP Board of Trustees

Santomero: from Board member’s perspective, he has been watching the evolution of the role of the CRO with interest. At McKinsey, 4 different roles are ascribed to CROs:

1. Risk organization; the CRO is organizer of a decentralized risk system (an orchestrator, if you will).
   
2. CRO is aggregator of risk (reporting function with standards, metrics).
   
3. Empowered advisor – sets risk appetites and policies.
   
4. Clearinghouse of risks, and thereby an owner of risk, that also reports to the Board.

The above are not four choices. They are roles of active participation within a company.

Rosengarten: The role of the CRO is not to just say No, but also to elaborate as to why the businesses you are involved in make sense. And of course, if they don’t make sense, why not? The roles of risk managers at successful organizations involve constructing debate and encouraging discussion. Risk managers should be involved in strategic planning and mitigation schemes, directly involved with the Board. Boards are more fluent in financial matters than risk managers, which is ironic because “risk produces returns.”

In short, risk planning, budgeting, and monitoring processes must be brought to the Board by the CRO.

*

Apologies for the brevity here, but just in these couple of paragraphs some interesting perspectives on the relationship of the CRO to the Board come to light.

Up next: lunch!

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Posted by Shaun Randol at 10:14 AM 0 comments

Coming on the heels of the 2009 Risk Manager of the Year Award is today's Keynote Address, delivered by Robert Jackson of the U.S. Treasury Department. More specifically, Mr. Jackson is with the Office of the Special Master for TARP Executive Compensation.

As a measure of how fascinating Mr. Jackson's presentation was, let me just say that I never once saw someone take out their Blackberry to check email or surf the web. Mr. Jackson delivered some heavy food for thought, and the hundreds in dark suits were all his. Here, then, are some highlights (we'll see if we can't get a copy of the presentation too, but don't hold your breath):

Overview:

Compensation packages played a contributing factor to the recent financial crisis. Restoring trust by changing compensation practices will help us get on the right course. A number of elements will play a key role in this re-alignment, as discussed:

1. Administration Principles on Compensation Reform
2. FSB Implementations Standards
3. Proposed Federal Reserve Guidance
4. TARP Compensation Regulations and Special Master Rulings
5. Summary of Considerations

1. What do we mean by compensation structures contributing to risk management? Performance metrics should take into account risk taking. For example, compensation structures should provide a space for risk managers to have a say. What elements and principles are being considered in the executive pay structure? These should be made know to the public as well.

2. In September 2009, all G-20 countries agreed to tough new implementation standards that will guide compensation decisions at financial institutions worldwide. See the Financial Stability Board standards here.

3. The Federal Reserve has issued proposed guidance identifying three key principles on the relationship between pay and risk, including:

• Balanced risk taking (e.g. lower sensitivity of pay settings)
• Effective controls and sound risk management (e.g. do risk managers have the independence they need?)
• Strong corporate governance (e.g. compensation committees should be set up, and they should communicate pay rates and reasons to the public)

4. Consistent with these principles, the Special Master's rulings require "exceptional assistance" firms to adopt pay structures that link to long-term performance.

• Special assistance firms like AIG and GMAC, for example, but these principles should be promoted beyond special assistance companies. There is a fundamental gulf of understanding of compensation between what executives understand and public understand.

5. Summary of considerations: Taken together, these reforms identify four key considerations for directors and risk managers to take into this year's board room discussions:

1. Analysis of the relationship between compensation and risk taking
2. Structural governance protections
3. Substantive guidance on pay structures
4. Disclosure and accountability to shareholders and the public

Mr. Jackson says that we need to better communicate complex risk management practices and policies to the public. Whether or not this is a rule for the SEC matters not, executives would be remiss not to explain this information to the public, especially given the lessons learned in the past couple of years.

Early empirical evidence of reform: Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley rewards payouts will take into account fundamental risk management measures. If risk management does not work, compensation is reeled in.

***

There were just a couple of questions from the audience:

Q. Relating to the market: How will firms retain the talent? Also, a dollar now is worth more than a dollar in the future, which might actually increase compensation packages.

A. Employees hedging compensation is absolutely critical. Stock sold short does not help the principle of the matter very much, if they were supposed to hold onto it for a few years.

Q. Final date for release of rules? Who will regulate?

A. Finalized by end of this year, early next. But the Federal Reserve is operating in face of regulatory uncertainty. U.S. Treasury wishes to be ahead of the analysis before new rules/guidance are promulgated. A new law is not needed, Boards want to get this compensation structure right.

***

Up next, some very brief notes from a panel discussion on emerging CRO roles.

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Posted by Shaun Randol at 10:13 AM 1 comments

GARP's 11th annual risk management convention and exhibition is well underway at the Mariott Hotel in Times Square, New York. The theme this year: Transforming Risk in a New World Order. With this blog, we'll try and highlight some of the happenings here to keep informed those worldwide who could not attend.

Up first, GARP President Richard Apostolik greeted the crowd and provided some general background for the hundreds in attendance this morning. By the end of the day, Mr. Apostolik expects to see some 800 conventioneers stream through. The stage was set for the presentation for the 2009 Risk Manager of the Year Award.

This year's recipient is Liu Mingkang, Chairman of the China Banking Regulatory Commission. A few words about this esteeemed gentleman, from the introductory remarks of Mr. Apostolik:

The roots of China's success can be traced back to the 2003 formation of the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and appointment of its current Chairman, Liu Mingkang. Under Mr. Liu's leadership the CBRC orchestrated the recapitalization of China's largest state-owned banks and has implemented a variety of disciplined risk management practices, regulatory oversight policies and corporate governance initiatives. All influenced by Mr. Liu's strong belief in the importance of prudential banking regulation.

In a June 2009 interview with the Financial Times, Mr. Liu summarizes what he believes to be the five major causes of the financial crisis:

• Lack of proper firewalls between commercial and investment banking activities.
• Neglect of macro-prudential regulation.
• Excess financial leverage and lack of transparency
• Short-term profit incentives versus long-term growth perspective
• Government bailouts provided short-term liquidity without solving underlying structural issues - primarily bank balance sheets.

... Since Mr. Liu's appointment in 2003, the capital adequacy of Chinese banks has increased dramatically. In 2003, eight Chinese institutions met minimum capital adequacy requirements. By the end of August 2009, 219 banks were in compliance. Furthermore, over this same six year period the ratio of non-performing loans (NPL) as a percent of total banking assets decreased from close to 18% to less than 2%. Given the performance, it's no surprise bank profitability has mproved dramatically at a time when many global banks have struggled to remain solvent in the face of losses on lending portfolios and illiquid investments. Average return-on-assets for five on China's largest commercial banks has almost doubled over the past three years while retuns-on-equity have increased more than 7%.

...Mr. Liu and the CBRC have been instrumental in guiding China's banking system through the recent financial crisis and have it well positioned for future success.

***

Unfortunately, Mr. Liu could not be in person to accept the award. But he did pass along a note to be read, part of which said: Regulators and supervisors share the common least thankful job, and we share the most risks. For better or for worse we will work together with you.

On his behalf, then, a Director General of CBRC, Liau Min, accepted the award and gave a presentation. Some highlights from this (you will forgive some of the choppy language I use, but the essence is still the same):

Being a regulator is the greatest job, except it is a thankless job. Being awarded the Risk Manager of the Year Award is vindication for their unsung, hard work.

CBRC provides a model for behavior for the rest of Chinese banking system.

CBRC established in 2003 – rolled out banking reform in 2004, including re-capitalization and restructuring and internal controls. Outsiders were brought in to lead and advise, international procedures were adopted. Banks experienced tremendous growth over the following eight years, but…

Can they be sustained? After all, rapid economic growth does not equal soundness of an economic system.

CBRC has six principles to keep in mind in for successful risk mitigation and supervisory practices:

I. Supervisors play a role: “We have been sticking to a set of simple, useful, and effective ratios and targets and limits and always kept a close eye on the key indicators for prudential regulation.” As such, they have 1 trillion RMB to offset any unforeseen upsets in the banking system and to hedge liquidity risk. Remember: “better safer than sorry.”

II. Don’t see trees for the forest. Stopped banks lending to speculative shares, training and monitoring carefully monitored the value of stocks held as collateral, for example.

III. Banking and capital markets – Glass Steagall Act principles held fast to keep risks divided, acts as a firewall. Friends agree most at a distance. Innovation is encouraged, but proper pricing is evaluated, social risk is taking into account.

IV. The quality of bank governance matters.

V. Emphasize risk oversight and transparency.

VI. Learn by doing: International advisors brought in for advice. Set high standards for success. Combat self-assessment. Basel is used as benchmark for supervisory practices. Gaps are identified in the supervisory system, and plans are drawn for future trajectories.


Challenges ahead: credit risk: next 5 years and beyond – transform from growth-driven, export-driven to quality and customer-driven. Potential risks in this sector must be accounted for.

“Creating a culture of risk awareness is GARP’s goal and it is CBRC’s goal as well.” The best time to do this is when times are good, not when they’ve already turned sour.

***

And that's that from the Risk Manager of the Year Award presentation and remarks. Up next, notes from the keynote address of Robert Jackson of the U.S. Treasury Department.

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Posted by Shaun Randol at 10:09 AM 0 comments